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The incentive-compatible design of deposit insurance and bank failure resolution : concepts and country studies, Volume 1
Author:Beck, Thorsten; Country:Brazil; Germany; Russian Federation;
Date Stored:2003/08/29Document Date:2003/05/31
Document Type:Policy Research Working PaperSubTopics:Financial Crisis Management & Restructuring; Payment Systems & Infrastructure; Banks & Banking Reform; Insurance & Risk Mitigation; Financial Intermediation; Insurance Law
Language:EnglishMajor Sector:(Historic)Sector not applicable
Region:Europe and Central Asia; Latin America & CaribbeanReport Number:WPS3043
Sub Sectors:(Historic)Sector not applicableCollection Title:Policy Research working paper series ; no. WPS 3043
Volume No:1  

Summary: Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs; on the other hand, they are supposed to minimize aggressive risk taking by banks. Beck discusses the incentive-compatible design and interaction of both components of the financial safety net and describes and compares three countries with different safety net arrangements-Brazil, Germany, and Russia.

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