Click here for search results
Antitrust-based remedies and dumping in international trade, Volume 1
Author:Hoekman, Bernard M.; Mavroidis, Petros C.; Date Stored:2001/04/20
Document Date:1994/08/31Document Type:Policy Research Working Paper
SubTopics:Environmental Economics & Policies; Economic Theory & Research; Markets and Market Access; Free Trade; Access to MarketsLanguage:English
Major Sector:(Historic)Economic PolicyReport Number:WPS1347
Sub Sectors:TradeCollection Title:Policy, Research working paper ; no. WPS 1347
Volume No:1  

Summary: The authors explore the possibility of government's seeking to agree to apply competition policy based considerations and disciplines in addressing unfair-trade allegations before turning to "standard" antidumping remedies. The premise of proponents of antidumping actions is that the existence of market power in exporter's home markets, or potential market dominance in the importing (host) market, is an important source of perceived "unfairness." But antidumping authorities do not investigate the existence of such situations. The authors propose that allegations of dumping first be investigated by competition authorities to determine the contestability of the relevant markets. Their proposal does not involve harmonization of competition laws. All that would change from the status quo is that a necessary condition for an antidumping action is that competition authorities find that the exporting firm's home market is not contestable, and conclude that no remedial action is possible through the application of competition law. Ideally, agreement along these lines would be sought in the multilateral (GATT) context, but bilateral or regional trade agreements could also be concluded. For example, European Union cooperation or association agreements might be extended along the lines proposed.

Official Documents
Official, scanned versions of documents (may include signatures, etc.)
File TypeDescriptionFile Size (mb)
PDF 36 pagesOfficial version*2.52 (approx.)
TextText version**
How To Order

* The official version is derived from scanning the final, paper copy of the document and is the official,
archived version including all signatures, charts, etc.
** The text version is the OCR text of the final scanned version and is not an accurate representation of the final text.
It is provided solely to benefit users with slow connectivity.

Permanent URL for this page: