Click here for search results
Political economy aspects of fuel subsidies : a conceptual framework
 
Author:Strand, Jon; Collection Title:Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 6392
Country:World; Date Stored:2013/03/27
Document Date:2013/03/01Document Type:Policy Research Working Paper
SubTopics:Energy Production and Transportation; Transport Economics Policy & Planning; Transport and Environment; Economic Theory & Research; Public Sector EconomicsLanguage:English
Major Sector:Energy and miningRel. Proj ID:1W-Political Economy Of Energy Subsidies And Their Reform -- -- P123604;
Region:The World RegionReport Number:WPS6392
Sub Sectors:Oil and gas; General energy sector; PowerVolume No:1 of 1

Summary: While notoriously inefficient, fuel subsidies are widespread, and in many cases politically stable. This paper discusses and models various political economy aspects of fuel subsidies, focusing on gasoline and kerosene. Both economic and political are considered to explain differences in subsidies, with particular focus on democratic and autocratic governments. A political process is modeled whereby a promise of low fuel prices is used in democracies to attract voters, and in autocracies to mobilize support among key groups. Subsidies to fuels are viewed as either easier to observe, easier to commit to, easier to deliver, or better targeted at core groups, than other public goods or favors offered by rulers. Easier commitment and delivery than for regular public goods can explain the high prevalence of such policies in autocracies, and also in young democracies where the capacity to commit to or deliver complex public goods is not yet fully developed. The analysis provides a framework for empirical testing and verification.

Official Documents
Official, scanned versions of documents (may include signatures, etc.)
File TypeDescriptionFile Size (mb)
PDF 27 pagesOfficial version*1.89 (approx.)
TextText version**
How To Order

See documents related to this project
* The official version is derived from scanning the final, paper copy of the document and is the official,
archived version including all signatures, charts, etc.
** The text version is the OCR text of the final scanned version and is not an accurate representation of the final text.
It is provided solely to benefit users with slow connectivity.



Permanent URL for this page: http://go.worldbank.org/SFAIG7UCM0