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Individual attitudes toward corruption: do social effects matter?, Volume 1
Author:Roberta Gatti; Stefano Paternostro; Jamele Rigolini; Country:World;
Date Stored:2003/09/12Document Date:2003/08/01
Document Type:Policy Research Working PaperSubTopics:Decentralization; Poverty Monitoring & Analysis; Health Economics & Finance; Pharmaceuticals & Pharmacoeconomics; Governance Indicators; National Governance; Environmental Economics & Policies
Language:EnglishRegion:The World Region
Report Number:WPS3122Collection Title:Policy, Research working paper series ; no. WPS 3122
Volume No:1  

Summary: Using individual-level data for 35 countries, the authors investigate the microeconomic determinants of attitudes toward corruption. They find women, employed, less wealthy, and older individuals to be more averse to corruption. The authors also provide evidence that social effects play an important role in determining individual attitudes toward corruption, as these are robustly and significantly associated with the average level of tolerance of corruption in the region. This finding lends empirical support to theoretical models where corruption emerges in multiple equilibria and suggests that "big-push" policies might be particularly effective in combating corruption.

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