Legislative malapportionment and institutional persistence, Vol. 1 of 1

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Legislative malapportionment and institutional persistence

Author:	Bruhn, Miriam; Gallego, Francisco; Onorato, Massimiliano;	Collection Title:	Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5467
Country:	Latin America; World;	Date Stored:	2010/11/02
Document Date:	2010/11/01	Document Type:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English	Region:	The World Region; Latin America & Caribbean
Report Number:	WPS5467	SubTopics:	Political Economy; Emerging Markets; Parliamentary Government; Political Systems and Analysis; Labor Policies
Volume No:	1 of 1

Summary: This paper argues that legislative malapportionment, denoting a discrepancy between the share of legislative seats and the share of population held by electoral districts, serves as a tool for pre-democratic elites to preserve their political power and economic interests after a transition to democracy. The authors claim that legislative malapportionment enhances the pre-democratic eliteﾒs political influence by over-representing areas that are more likely to vote for parties aligned with the elite. This biased political representation survives in equilibrium as long as it helps democratic consolidation. Using data from Latin America, the authors document empirically that malapportionment increases the probability of transitioning to a democracy. Moreover, the data show that over-represented electoral districts are more likely to vote for parties close to pre-democracy ruling groups. The analysis also finds that overrepresented areas have lower levels of political competition and receive more transfers per capita from the central government, both of which favor the persistence of power of pre-democracy elites.


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