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What drives corporate governance reform? firm-level evidence from Eastern Europe, Volume 1
 
Author:Klapper, Leora F; Laeven, Luc; Love, Inessa; Collection Title:Policy, Research working paper ; no. WPS 3600
Country:South Eastern Europe and Balkans; Date Stored:2005/06/01
Document Date:2005/05/01Document Type:Policy Research Working Paper
SubTopics:Small Scale Enterprise; Financial Crisis Management & Restructuring; National Governance; Microfinance; Private Participation in InfrastructureLanguage:English
Region:Europe and Central AsiaReport Number:WPS3600
Volume No:1  

Summary: The authors study differences in the use of two corporate governance provisions - cumulative voting and proxy by mail voting - in a sample of 224 firms located in four Eastern European countries. The report finds a significant relationship between ownership structure, and the use of corporate governance provisions. Firms with a controlling owner (owning more than 50 percent of shares) are less likely to adopt either of the two provisions. However, firms that have large, minority shareholders are more likely to adopt these provisions. The authors do not find any significant relationship between the use of these provisions, and foreign ownership. The results suggest that the decision to adopt these corporate governance provisions is influenced by large, minority shareholders in their battle for representation in the board, and in managerial decisions.

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