Click here for search results
Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis
 
Author:Keefer, Philip; Collection Title:Policy, Research working paper ; no. WPS 3439
Country:World; Date Stored:2004/11/09
Document Date:2004/10/01Document Type:Policy Research Working Paper
SubTopics:Payment Systems & Infrastructure; Economic Theory & Research; Financial Crisis Management & Restructuring; Banks & Banking Reform; National Governance; Decentralization; Financial IntermediationLanguage:English
Region:The World RegionReport Number:WPS3439
Volume No:1 of 1  

Summary: The author proposes a new approach to explain why the costs of crisis are greater in some countries than in others. He begins with the premise that many crises result from the willingness of politicians to cater to special interests, at the expense of broad social interests. A parsimonious model predicts that the less costly it is for average citizens to expel politicians, the more veto players there are; the less important are exogenous shocks, and the more difficult it is for politicians and special interests to forge credible agreements, the lower the costs of crisis are. Though these predictions differ from those in the literature, empirical evidence presented shows that they explain the fiscal costs of financial crisis, even after controlling for the financial sector policies believed to contribute most to the efficient prevention, and resolution of financial crisis.

Official Documents
Official, scanned versions of documents (may include signatures, etc.)
File TypeDescriptionFile Size (mb)
PDF 49 pagesOfficial version*0.34
TextText version**
How To Order
Light-Weight Documents
Lighter (less MB) documents which may or may not be the final, official version
File TypeDescriptionFile Size (mb)
PDF 49 pagesWPS34390.23

* The official version is derived from scanning the final, paper copy of the document and is the official,
archived version including all signatures, charts, etc.
** The text version is the OCR text of the final scanned version and is not an accurate representation of the final text.
It is provided solely to benefit users with slow connectivity.



Permanent URL for this page: http://go.worldbank.org/8AXB9QWR90