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Toolkit for Informality Scenario Analysis
Lakner-Milanovic (2013) World Panel Income Distribution (LM-WPID)

World Bank working papers and publications

1 .Pyramid capitalism : political connections, regulation, and firm productivity in Egypt
2 .Was Weber right ? the effects of pay for ability and pay for performance on pro-social motivation, ability and effort in the public sector
3 .Party age and party color : new results on the political economy of redistribution and inequality
4 .Radio's impact on preferences for patronage benefits
5 .Intrinsic motivation, effort and the call to public service
6 .The organization of political parties and the politics of bureaucratic reform
7 .Political budget cycles and the organization of political parties
8 .Promises, promises : vote-buying and the electoral mobilization strategies of non-credible politicians
9 .Organizing for prosperity : collective action, political parties and the political economy of development
10 .Why follow the leader ? collective action, credible commitment and conflict
11 .Do informed citizens receive more...or pay more ? the impact of radio on the government distribution of public health benefits
12 .Collective action, political parties and pro-development public policy
13 .Mass media and public services : the effects of radio access on public education in Benin
14 .Innocent bystanders : developing countries and the war on drugs
15 .The ethnicity distraction ? political credibility and partisan preferences in Africa
16 .Earthquake propensity and the politics of mortality prevention
17 .When do Legislators pass on "Pork" ? the determinants of legislator utilization of a constituency development fund in India
18 .The development impact of the illegality of drug trade
19 .The World Bank economic review 22 (1)
20 .Insurgency and credible commitment in autocracies and democracies
21 .Beyond legal origin and checks and balances : political credibility, citizen information, and financial sector development
22 .The World Bank research observer 22 (2)
23 .Democratization and clientelism: why are young democracies badly governed?
24 .The World Bank research observer 20 (1)
25 .Democracy, credibility and clientelism
26 .Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis
27 .A review of the political economy of governance : from property rights to voice
28 .What does political economy tell us about economic development - and vice versa?
29 .Democracy, public expenditures, and the poor
30 .Boondoogles and expropriation : rent-sseking and policy distortion when property rights are insecure
31 .Social polarization, social institutions, and country creditworthiness
32 .Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments
33 .When do special interests run rampant ? disentangling the role in banking crises of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances
34 .The World Bank economic review 15 (1)
35 .Polarization, politics, and property rights : links between inequality and growth
36 .Bureaucratic delegation and political institutions: when are independent central banks irrelevent?
37 .New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions

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