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Philip Keefer

Lead Economist

PHILIP KEEFER is a Lead Research Economist in the Development Research Group of the World Bank. Since receiving his PhD in Economics from Washington University at St. Louis, he has worked continuously on the interaction of institutions, political economy and economic development. His research has included investigations of the impact of insecure property rights on economic growth; the effect of political credibility on the policy choices of governments; and the sources of political credibility in democracies and autocracies. It has appeared in journals that span economics and political science, ranging from the Quarterly Journal of Economics to the American Review of Political Science, and has been influenced by his work in a wide range of countries, including Bangladesh, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, México, Perú, Pakistan and the Philippines.

The author's works below are drawn from the World Bank's institutional archives. You can also download other documents by this author.


World Bank working papers and publications

1 .Radio's impact on preferences for patronage benefits
2 .Intrinsic motivation, effort and the call to public service
3 .The organization of political parties and the politics of bureaucratic reform
4 .Political budget cycles and the organization of political parties
5 .Promises, promises : vote-buying and the electoral mobilization strategies of non-credible politicians
6 .Organizing for prosperity : collective action, political parties and the political economy of development
7 .Why follow the leader ? collective action, credible commitment and conflict
8 .Do informed citizens receive more...or pay more ? the impact of radio on the government distribution of public health benefits
9 .Collective action, political parties and pro-development public policy
10 .Mass media and public services : the effects of radio access on public education in Benin
11 .Innocent bystanders : developing countries and the war on drugs
12 .The ethnicity distraction ? political credibility and partisan preferences in Africa
13 .Earthquake propensity and the politics of mortality prevention
14 .When do Legislators pass on "Pork" ? the determinants of legislator utilization of a constituency development fund in India
15 .The development impact of the illegality of drug trade
16 .The World Bank economic review 22 (1)
17 .Insurgency and credible commitment in autocracies and democracies
18 .Beyond legal origin and checks and balances : political credibility, citizen information, and financial sector development
19 .The World Bank research observer 22 (2)
20 .Democratization and clientelism: why are young democracies badly governed?
21 .The World Bank research observer 20 (1)
22 .Democracy, credibility and clientelism
23 .Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis
24 .A review of the political economy of governance : from property rights to voice
25 .What does political economy tell us about economic development - and vice versa?
26 .Democracy, public expenditures, and the poor
27 .Boondoogles and expropriation : rent-sseking and policy distortion when property rights are insecure
28 .Social polarization, social institutions, and country creditworthiness
29 .Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments
30 .When do special interests run rampant ? disentangling the role in banking crises of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances
31 .The World Bank economic review 15 (1)
32 .Polarization, politics, and property rights : links between inequality and growth
33 .Bureaucratic delegation and political institutions: when are independent central banks irrelevent?
34 .New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions




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