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Philip Keefer

Lead Economist

PHILIP KEEFER is a Lead Research Economist in the Development Research Group of the World Bank. Since receiving his PhD in Economics from Washington University at St. Louis, he has worked continuously on the interaction of institutions, political economy and economic development. His research has included investigations of the impact of insecure property rights on economic growth; the effect of political credibility on the policy choices of governments; and the sources of political credibility in democracies and autocracies. It has appeared in journals that span economics and political science, ranging from the Quarterly Journal of Economics to the American Review of Political Science, and has been influenced by his work in a wide range of countries, including Bangladesh, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, México, Perú, Pakistan and the Philippines.

The author's works below are drawn from the World Bank's institutional archives. You can also download other documents by this author.


World Bank working papers and publications

1 .When do Legislators pass on "Pork" ? the determinants of legislator utilization of a constituency development fund in India
2 .The development impact of the illegality of drug trade
3 .The World Bank economic review 22 (1)
4 .Insurgency and credible commitment in autocracies and democracies
5 .Beyond legal origin and checks and balances : political credibility, citizen information, and financial sector development
6 .Democratization and clientelism: why are young democracies badly governed?
7 .The World Bank research observer 20 (1)
8 .Democracy, credibility and clientelism
9 .Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis
10 .A review of the political economy of governance : from property rights to voice
11 .What does political economy tell us about economic development - and vice versa?
12 .Democracy, public expenditures, and the poor
13 .Boondoogles and expropriation : rent-sseking and policy distortion when property rights are insecure
14 .Social polarization, social institutions, and country creditworthiness
15 .Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments
16 .When do special interests run rampant ? disentangling the role in banking crises of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances
17 .The World Bank economic review 15 (1)
18 .Polarization, politics, and property rights : links between inequality and growth
19 .Bureaucratic delegation and political institutions: when are independent central banks irrelevent?
20 .New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions




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