In our view, sustainable improvements to service delivery systems for poor people are likely to require, among other things:

broad-based economic growth;
progressive and stable taxation;
adequate levels of public expenditure;
strong technical interventions in individual sectors;
widespread political commitment to providing quality, universal basic services;
institutional development of sector systems; and
mechanisms for accountability and participation.

The report focuses almost exclusively on the last two points. It ignores entirely the broad development context which constrains the policy choices available to poor countries, and which the World Bank and other donor institutions do so much to shape. It suggests that because public spending levels are weakly correlated with human development outcomes, either public spending levels do not matter, or that increased public spending should only be made available to reformed systems.

The report also fails to address the need for strong technical knowledge in creating effective services, or ask whether a separation of policy maker and provider function is likely to build or undermine this technical knowledge.

While the WDR cannot address in detail every issue related to the report title, it needs to place its focus on accountability in its proper context.

Submitted by: Patrick Watt -- June 10,2003
Country of Residence: United Kingdom
Country of Origin/Citizenship: United Kingdom
Institutional Affiliation: ActionAid
Occupation: Policy adviser
Language:

When cholera first appeared on South Africa’s Dolphin Coast in August 2000, officials first assumed it was just another of the sporadic outbursts that have long stricken the country’s eastern seaboard. But as the epidemic spread, it turned out to be a chronicle of death foretold by blind ideology.

In 1998, local councils had begun to take steps to commercialize their waterworks by forcing residents to pay the full cost of drinking water. But many of the millions of people living in the tin-roof slums of the region couldn’t afford the rates. Cut off at the tap, they were forced to find water in streams, ponds and lakes polluted with manure and human waste.

By January 2002, when the worst cholera epidemic in South Africa’s history ended, it had infected more than 300,000 people, by some estimates, and killed almost 300, spreading as far as Johannesburg, 300 miles away.

Making people pay the full cost of their water “was the direct cause of the cholera epidemic,” David Hemson, a social scientist sent by the government to investigate the outbreak, said in an interview. “There is no doubt about that.”

Submitted by: Stephen Gasteyer and Rahul Vaswani -- June 05,2003
Country of Residence: United States
Country of Origin/Citizenship: India
Institutional Affiliation: RCAP
Occupation: Rural Development Analysts
Language:

For the local clients, pricing is a matter of social equity, an instrument of economic development and environmental policy, and of demand management. The capacity of charging unregulated user fees can often by abused by providers such as large ‘unmanageable’ transnational corporations and private providers with a clear focus on solely economic goals.

The nature of private corporations is to maximize profits; theirs is not a goal of the larger public, or even private, good. Policy makers, and thus clients, can often have to negotiate with such providers under the stress of unequal power relations with regards to fees.

When user fees are meant for solely cost recovery and are not reflective of socioeconomic realities, it is the poorest sections that suffer most. The information provided in Box 9.10 of private sector participation in Argentina ad Manila ignores this reality. Contrary to the described case, the lack of water services, which are essential to the ability of poor clients to provide other service for themselves, can lead to a social breakdown in terms of public health and sanitation.

Submitted by: Stephen Gasteyer and Rahul Vaswani -- June 05,2003
Country of Residence: United States
Country of Origin/Citizenship: India
Institutional Affiliation: RCAP
Occupation: Rural Development Analysts
Language:

In January 1997, a report by the official audit body of France, the Cour des Comptes, produced a report on “Local water and sewerage services” (available on the internet). It included a series of damaging criticisms:

Lack of competition : “repeated use of the negotiated procedure, nearly always with the same companies” and “A tendency to extend existing contracts” without subjecting them to tender, which has created “substantial profit margins”.

Lack of transparency: “The lack of supervision and control of delegated public services, aggravated by the lack of transparency of this form of management, has led to abuses” - in one major city, Metz, the private water company did not submit any accounts to the city council for 20 years; in Bandol-Savary (near Toulon) a Vivendi company charged the council twice over for the same treatment, every year.

Corruption: there have been criminal convictions for corruption of executives of both Suez-Lyonnaise (at Grenoble) and Vivendi (at Reunion, and Angouleme)

Price rises: Water prices have risen at an average rate of 10% per year in France since 1992, but most of all where water has been privatized. The companies claim that most of this is due to the heavy investments required, but the report found many cases where price rises had no possible link with investments: “The increase in prices has to be seen in relation to the privatization of services”

Unequal power: the report repeatedly emphasizes the disparity between the local authorities and the three giant companies. The system “left elected councilors on their own, without support, to deal with conglomerates wielding immense political, economic and financial power”

Submitted by: Stephen Gasteyer and Rahul Vaswani -- June 05,2003
Country of Residence: United States
Country of Origin/Citizenship: India
Institutional Affiliation: RCAP
Occupation: Rural Development Analysts
Language:

Teachers absenteeism

Teacher absenteeism is described as a major problem in the WDR draft. It is true that this is a problem in some countries, but it may also be appropriate to recognise that it is not a problem everywhere. In those countries where it prevails it is necessary to look for the reasons behind the problem.

VSO noted in their case study that the “poor absolute value of the teachers' salaries was a significant factor influencing their motivation” (p.25, VSO, 2002,). Low teacher salaries in most countries, as well as the non-payment of salaries during prolonged periods of time in some; reflects the low regard that most have for the teaching profession. This kind of environment is demoralising and affects a teacher’s morale and dignity. Under such circumstances, many teachers are forced to look for other jobs in order to supplement and at times replace teaching. In some cases teachers may also try to do two jobs at the same time. This is not an excuse for teacher absenteeism, but an explanation.

Even if the World Bank argues that some teachers are well paid, there are reasons to be sceptical of this statement. The method used by the World Bank to compare teacher salaries in for example the indicative framework (World Bank, 2002) has already been investigated in an earlier report published by the World Bank: "Simplistic observations, such as teachers' salaries as a percentage of gross national products per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa are too high compared with other regions and therefore have to be lowered, ignore not only economic and institutional factors involved in setting salaries, but also the possible adverse impact on teachers' productivity of lowering their salaries inordinately. Given that the relationship of salaries to the supply of teacher services in terms of quality and quantity varies from country to country, measures to affect and change this relationship must be tailored to local circumstances." (p. 136, Zymelman and DeStefano, 1993,).

As can be seen in information on salaries in several world cities collected by UBS (2000) several groups of workers/employees, such as engineers, department managers, bank credit clerks, skilled industrial workers and secretaries, have salaries higher than teacher salaries. In for example Lagos, Jakarta and Sao Paulo bus drivers earn more than primary teachers do. "The general impression which emerges from these comparisons is that, in the wage hierarchy, teachers do not occupy the place to which their qualifications and responsibilities should entitle them." (p. 96, ILO, 1991)

Another reason behind teacher absenteeism is a system of political appointments of “teachers” in some countries. Local politicians appoint “teachers” who do not need to show up at schools or in some cases they do not really exist ("ghost teachers"). Someone - often in the Ministry or at times in the armed forces - gets an extra salary. Such practices add to "teacher absenteeism" and those who turn up for work to earn their salaries are condemned for corrupt political practices of others.

Submitted by: -- May 30,2003
Country of Residence: Belgium
Country of Origin/Citizenship: Belgium
Institutional Affiliation: Education International
Occupation:
Language: