Why are some countries so rich and others so poor? A big part of the answer to this question has to do with differences across countries in the quality of their institutions. Good institutions of public decision-making and competent governments enable societies to choose growth-enhancing policies and sound development strategies. Institutions that protect property rights and ensure that contracts are enforced help create an economic environment in which individuals and firms can interact to their mutual benefit. Good institutions remove the opportunities and incentives for corrupt behavior, thus strengthening trust and institutional effectiveness.
The research described on this page contributes to the growing evidence on the role of governance and institutions for economic development. It is concerned with the following questions:
• How do we measure governance and institutional quality?
• How does governance affect growth and development? What are the mechanisms, and how big are the effects?
• What are the determinants of good governance? What are the incentives for governments to make decisions in the interest of the population? What role do social norms and political institutions play?
• What policy responses can mitigate, or compensate, the adverse consequences of poor governance for growth and development? What can be expected from mechanisms such as information provision to citizens, report cards and community-driven development?
Publications and Working Papers
Journal articles, book chapters and other publications,
This page lists recent scholarly publications by staff working in the area of Macroeconomics and Growth. Publications are organized by topic and appear in reverse chronological order.
Policy Research Working Papers
For more policy research working papers from the World Bank's institutional archives, search here using author’s last name, title or working paper number (“wpsxxxx”).
|WPS6254||Income risk, income mobility and welfare||Krebs, Tom; Krishna, Pravin; Maloney, William F.||2012/10|
|WPS6223||Making up people -- the effect of identity on preferences and performance in a modernizing society||Hoff, Karla; Pandey, Priyanka||2012/10|
|WPS6064||Experiments in culture and corruption : a review||Banuri, Sheheryar; Eckel, Catherine||2012/05|
|WPS5952||Do informed citizens receive more...or pay more ? the impact of radio on the government distribution of public health benefits||Keefer, Philip; Khemani, Stuti||2012/01|
|WPS5760||Tastes, castes, and culture : the influence of society on preferences||Fehr, Ernst; Hoff, Karla||2011/08|
|WPS5676||Collective action, political parties and pro-development public policy||Keefer, Philip||2011/06|
|WPS5646||Good countries or good projects ? macro and micro correlates of World Bank project performance||Denizer, Cevdet; Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart||2011/05|
|WPS5415||Does respondent reticence affect the results of corruption surveys ? evidence from the world bank enterprise survey for Nigeria||Clausen, Bianca; Kraay, Aart; Murrell, Peter||2010/09|
|WPS5430||The worldwide governance indicators : methodology and analytical issues||Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo||2010/09|
|WPS5254||Can disaggregated indicators identify governance reform priorities ?||Kraay, Aart; Tawara, Norikazu||2010/03|
|WPS5236||The ethnicity distraction ? political credibility and partisan preferences in Africa||Keefer, Philip||2010/03|
|WPS5183||Dysfunctional finance : positive shocks and negative outcomes||Hoff, Karla||2010/01|
|WPS5182||Earthquake propensity and the politics of mortality prevention||Keefer, Philip; Neumayer, Eric; Plumper, Thomas||2010/01|
|WPS5084||Who survives ? the impact of corruption, competition and property rights across firms||Hallward-Driemeier, Mary||2009/10|
|WPS5040||Caste and punishment : the legacy of caste culture in norm enforcement||Hoff, Karla; Kshetramade, Mayuresh; Fehr, Ernst||2009/09|
|WPS5029||Privatization and nationalization cycles||Chang, Roberto; Hevia, Constantino; Loayza, Norman||2009/08|
|WPS4929||When do Legislators pass on "Pork" ? the determinants of legislator utilization of a constituency development fund in India||Keefer, Philip; Khemani, Stuti||2009/05|
|WPS4902||Banking on politics||Braun, Matias; Raddatz, Claudio||2009/04|
|WPS4747||Political alternation as a restraint on investing in influence : evidence from the post-communist transition||Milanovic, Branko; Hoff, Karla; Horowitz, Shale||2008/10|
|WPS4762||Populist fiscal policy||Khemani, Stuti; Wane, Waly||2008/10|
|WPS4654||Governance matters VII : aggregate and individual governance indicators 1996-2007||Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo||2008/06|
|WPS4632||Instrumental variables regressions with honestly uncertain exclusion restrictions||Kraay, Aart||2008/05|
|WPS4619||Spite and development||Fehr, Ernst; Hoff, Karla; Kshetramade, Mayuresh||2008/05|
|WPS4565||Evo, Pablo, Tony, Diego, and Sonny - general equilibrium analysis of the illegal drugs market||Chumacero, Romulo A.||2008/03|
|WPS4543||The development impact of the illegality of drug trade||Keefer, Philip; Loayza, Norman V.; Soares, Rodrigo R.||2008/03|
|WPS4553||The historical foundations of the narcotic drug control regime||Buxton, Julia||2008/03|
|WPS4154||Beyond legal origin and checks and balances : political credibility, citizen information, and financial sector development||Keefer, Philip||2007/03|
|WPS3575||The kin system as a poverty trap?||Hoff, Karla; Sen, Arijit||2005/04|
|WPS3472||Democracy, credibility and clientelism||Keefer, Philip; Vlaicu, Razvan||2005/01|
|WPS3479||Why should we care about child labor? The education, labor market, and health consequences of child labor||Beegle, Kathleen; Dehejia, Rajeev; Gatti, Roberta||2005/01|
|WPS3315||A review of the political economy of governance : from property rights to voice||Keefer, Philip||2004/05|
|WPS3316||Homeownership, community interactions, and segregation||Hoff, Karla; Sen, Arijit||2004/05|
|WPS3250||What does political economy tell us about economic development - and vice versa?||Keefer, Philip||2004/03|
|WPS3164||Democracy, public expenditures, and the poor||Keefer, Philip; Khemani, Stuti||2003/11|
|WPS3161||Liquidity needs and vulnerability to financial udnerdevelopment||Raddatz, Claudio||2003/11|
|WPS3160||Monetary policy and sectoral shocks : did the Federal Reserve react properly to the high-tech crisis?||Claudio Raddatz; Roberto Rigobon||2003/11|
|WPS2772||Governance matters II - updated indicators for 2000-01||Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo||2002/02|
|WPS2783||Ownership, competition, and corruption : bribe takers versus bribe payers||Clarke, George R. G.; Lixin Colin Xu||2002/02|
|WPS2767||Child labor : the role of income variability and access to credit in a cross-section of countries||Dehejia, Rajeev H.; Gatti, Roberta||2002/01|
|WPS2542||Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments||Keefer, Philip; Stasavage, David||2001/02|
|WPS2534||Indigenous ethnicity and entrepreneurial success in Africa : some evidence from Ethiopia||Mengistae, Taye||2001/01|
|WPS2482||Can institutions resolve ethnic conflict ?||Easterly, William||2000/11|
|WPS2356||Bureaucratic delegation and political institutions: when are independent central banks irrelevent?||Keffer, Philip; Stasavage, David||2000/06|
|WPS2195||Aggregating governance indicators||Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo||1999/10|
|WPS2196||Governance matters||Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo||1999/10|
|WPS2108||Public goods and ethnic divisions||Alesina, Alberto; Baqir, Reza; Easterly, William||1999/05|