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Incentives & Behavior

NIPR--New Ideas in Pollution Regulation

The Economics of Industrial Pollution Control research team is developing a perspective on polluters and their relationship to broader society. Key to this understanding is the idea that there are multiple actors and multiple incentives involved in pollution and abatement behavior. Regulators have many opportunities to affect this complicated system, but are unable to completely control it. A better image is that of regulator as "orchestrater" encouraging, cajoling, and threatening various parties to move towards a better result.


The following policy research working papers related to NIPR--New Ideas in Pollution, are drawn from the World Bank's institutional archives. Each link opens a page with an abstract of the document and several download options. You can also download other related documents. These include content-rich current outputs not stored in the institutional archives.

 

Library

WPS2936Industrial ownership and environmental performance : evidence from ChinaHua Wang; Yanhong Jin2002/12
WPS2937The determinants of Government environmental performance - an empirical analysis of Chinese townshipsHua Wang; Wenhua Di2002/12
WPS2756Incomplete enforcement of pollution regulation : bargaining power of Chinese factoriesHua Wang; Mamingi, Nlandu; Laplante, Benoit; Dasgupta, Susmita2002/01
WPS2285Industrial environmental performance in China - the impact of inspectionsDasgupta, Susmita; Laplante, Benoit; Namingi, Nlandu; Hua Wang2000/02
WPS2029Small manufacturing plants, pollution, and poverty : new evidence from Brazil and MexicoDasgupta, Susmita; Lucas, Robert E. B.; Wheeler, David1998/12
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