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Incentives & Behavior
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| NIPR--New Ideas in Pollution Regulation |
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The Economics of Industrial Pollution Control research team is developing a perspective on polluters and their relationship to broader society. Key to this understanding is the idea that there are multiple actors and multiple incentives involved in pollution and abatement behavior. Regulators have many opportunities to affect this complicated system, but are unable to completely control it. A better image is that of regulator as "orchestrater" encouraging, cajoling, and threatening various parties to move towards a better result.
The following policy research working papers related to NIPR--New Ideas in Pollution, are drawn from the World Bank's institutional archives. Each link opens a page with an abstract of the document and several download options. You can also download other related documents. These include content-rich current outputs not stored in the institutional archives.
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Library| WPS2936 | Industrial ownership and environmental performance : evidence from China | Hua Wang; Yanhong Jin | 2002/12 | | WPS2937 | The determinants of Government environmental performance - an empirical analysis of Chinese townships | Hua Wang; Wenhua Di | 2002/12 | | WPS2756 | Incomplete enforcement of pollution regulation : bargaining power of Chinese factories | Hua Wang; Mamingi, Nlandu; Laplante, Benoit; Dasgupta, Susmita | 2002/01 | | WPS2285 | Industrial environmental performance in China - the impact of inspections | Dasgupta, Susmita; Laplante, Benoit; Namingi, Nlandu; Hua Wang | 2000/02 | | WPS2029 | Small manufacturing plants, pollution, and poverty : new evidence from Brazil and Mexico | Dasgupta, Susmita; Lucas, Robert E. B.; Wheeler, David | 1998/12 |
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