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Private Investment and the Institutionalization of Collective Action in Autocracies

Authors:Philip E. Keefer
Non-Bank Author:Scott Gehlbach
Citation: 

Gehlbach, Scott and Keefer, Philip, Private Investment and the Institutionalization of Collective Action in Autocracies: Ruling Parties and Legislatures (November 23, 2011). Upcoming publication in Journal of Politics.  Available now at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1663057

Abstract: Despite the absence of formal institutions to constrain opportunistic behavior, some autocracies successfully attract private investment. Prior work explains such success by the relative size of the autocrat's winning coalition or the existence of legislatures. We advance on this understanding by focusing on the key constraint limiting coalition size and legislative efficacy: organizational arrangements that allow group members to act collectively against the ruler. We introduce three new quantitative measures of the ability of ruling party members to act collectively: ruling-party institutionalization, the regularity of leader entry, and the competitiveness of legislative elections. These characteristics are robustly associated with higher investment. Our evidence also points to an effect on the risk of expropriation in non-democracies.

Background STATA data and DO files:
DO fileData files
Gehlbach Keefer JOP replication DO file

Replication data for non-democratic episodes, base definition
nondem_cross_alt_main3_replic.dta

 Replication data for very strictly defined non-democratic episodes
nondem_cross_verystrict_main3_replic.dta
Replication data for strictly defined non-democratic episodes
nondem_cross_strict_main3_replic.dta
 

Replication data for non-democratic episodes, meeting both base definition and Cheibub, et al. criteria
nondem_cross_cheibub_overlap_main3_replic.dta

Replication data for non-democratic episodes, meeting Cheibub, et al. criteria
nondem_cross_cheibub_main3_replic.dta

 



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